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Chapter 3 
 
Prospect of Contract Farming 
 
- Experiences in Developed and Developing Economies and the 
Current Situation in China- 
                    
 
This chapter provides a selective review of empirical research on the contract farming, 
poverty impact of high-value agriculture, and modern marketing methods. The focus of 
this chapter is to review what types of contract arrangements have worked or not 
worked under various circumstances and to explore the common findings from the 
developed and developing countries’ experiences. What can we learn from the 
experiences in contract farming schemes in developing countries as well as developed 
countries? What role can the government play for successful contact farming? Are there 
any patterns in contract farming models according to the commodity type, the farmer 
scale, or land size? What are the modern marketing methods found in high value 
agriculture commodities? This chapter aims to provide some answers to these questions. 
The empirical research reviewed is mainly from the experience in developing countries, 
focusing on the poverty impact in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, along with some 
from the developed countries.  
 Contract farming has been studied since 1970s, with the early empirical research being 
mostly descriptive. For example, case studies in Africa have focused on the historical 
and political context of contract farming, conflicts between farmers and the contracting 
firms, and the imbalance of power between the two parties, among others. As more data 
at the farmer level were collected, more rigorous studies began to emerge. There are 
studies that have skeptical views as well as those that discuss the benefits of contract 
farming for farmers. This chapter examines both of these views in detail. The chapter is 
organized into six sections. The first section provides some background as to the 
importance of contract farming in vertical coordination. The second section reviews the 
empirical research of qualitative studies. The third section assesses the studies that used 
more rigorous econometric analysis. The fifth section discusses the preliminary results 
from the firm survey of the pork industry conducted in 2008 in Henan province and Jilin 
province in China. The sixth section provides the concluding remarks.  
 
1. Background and Vertical Coordination of the Value Chain 
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The changes in food and agricultural markets (the so-called industrialization of 
agriculture) have influenced the need for higher levels of managed coordination in 
agriculture commodity value chains. “This has resulted in the introduction of different 
forms of vertical integration and alliances, which have become a dominant feature of 
agricultural supply chains” (Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002). Allied to these changes is a 
worldwide increase in consumer demand for differentiated agricultural products that are 
relatively labor intensive (Rhodes, 1993; Royer, 1995; Pasour, 1998). These consumer 
demands, together with food safety issues (particularly more of a concern in fresh food 
products), have led to major concerns for developing countries. Fresh food products, 
which include fresh meat, seafood, vegetables, and fruits, account for half the value of 
total food and agricultural exports from developing countries (Unneveher, 2000).  
In many developed countries, agricultural production used to be an industry 
dominated by family-based small-scale farms or firms. However, this has changed 
rapidly to larger firms that are more tightly aligned across the production and 
distribution value chain (Boehlje, 2000). Additionally, the trend of market-oriented 
reforms, following multilateral trade liberalization and especially structural adjustment 
programs in developing countries, has led to the increased integration of world markets 
(Reardon & Barrett, 2000). Contract farming has taken a role in bringing farmers and 
large firms closer. Contract farming is a type of agricultural production based on "those 
contractual arrangements between farmers and companies, whether oral or written, 
specifying one or more conditions of production and/or marketing of an agricultural 
product" (Ewell, 1963:3). Contract farming takes different forms according to what 
conditions of production and/or marketing it specifies (Ewell, 1963:5-6; Wilson, 
1986:50). 
 The role of contract farming in developing countries has been a topic of interest and 
some controversy, existing at least since the 1970s (Morrisey, 1974; Glover, 1984; 
Minot, 1986). Critics of contract farming argue that large agribusiness firms use 
contracts to take advantage of cheap labor and transfer production risk to farmers. 
Another concern is that because companies tend to prefer to work with medium- and 
large-scale growers, smallholders will be marginalized, exacerbating rural inequality 
(Little and Watts, 1994; Singh, 2002).  Others are less pessimistic, seeing contract 
farming as a means to incorporate small farmers into growing markets for processed 
goods and export commodities. Because the contracts often involve the provision of 
seed, fertilizer, and technical assistance on credit and a guaranteed price at harvest, this 
form of vertical coordination simultaneously solves a number of constraints on 
small-farm productivity, including access to inputs, credit, and risk.  In this view, 
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contract farming is an institutional solution to the problems of market failure in the 
provision of credit and agricultural inputs (Grosh, 1994; Key and Rungsten, 1999). 
 Contract farming often involves a large-scale buyer, such as an exporter or a food 
processor that needs to ensure a steady supply of raw materials meeting certain quality 
standards. Meeting certain quality standards for a buyer becomes critical especially 
when a buyer wishes to export to countries with strict quality and safety standards. As 
such, contracting is rare for basic staple foods produced for local consumption and more 
common for industrial crops (e.g. sugarcane, tobacco, and tea), poultry, dairy, and 
horticulture, particularly when destined for high-income consumers willing to pay a 
premium for quality and food safety (Minot, 1986; Jaffee and Morton, 1994). 
 There are few estimates of the prevalence of contract farming and no estimates of 
trends over time, but changes in global agricultural markets provide some hints. First, 
rapid income growth, particularly in Asia, is shifting consumption away from staple 
grains and toward high-value commodities such as meat, fish, dairy, and horticulture 
and toward processed foods (Minot and Roy, 2006).  Second, income growth, 
urbanization, and foreign investment are driving a consolidation in retail food outlets, 
the supermarket revolution (Reardon et al, 2003). Third, lower trade barriers and 
improved communication technology are expanding trade linkages, connecting small 
farmers in developing countries with high-income consumers in developing country 
cities and in industrialized countries. The growth in high-value agriculture, 
supermarkets, processing, and export-oriented agriculture suggest that the importance of 
contract farming is growing. 
 
2. Review of Studies on Contract Farming – Qualitative Analyses 
 
Various forms of contract farming have been found in the developed countries as far 
back as the 1880s. Methods of this type of farming were employed by United States 
multinationals in Central America at the beginning of the 20th century and by the 
Japanese to secure sugar production in Taiwan from 1885 (Runsten & Key, 1996). From 
the 1930’s to 1950’s, contracting was used increasingly in many food and fiber sectors. 
The fruit and vegetable canning sectors expanded in the United States and Europe 
(Little & Watts, 1994; Clapp, 1994) and merchants in Europe and North America 
entered into seed production contracts with growers in Australia, Britain, Canada, 
France, Holland, Hungary, and the United States (Watts, 1994). From the late 1950s, 
Mexican growers increasingly supplied the American markets with fruit and vegetables 
under contract and in the period 1960–80, there was a significant increase in contracting 
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for vegetables, fruit, nuts, and seed crops (Watts, 1994; Kilmer, 1986). By the late 20th 
century, contract farming was widespread across Western Europe, the United States, 
and Japan (Rehber, 1998). Contract farming has also spread rapidly in Asia, Latin 
America and Africa.  
 The way farmers comprehend contract farming, such as how their relationship with 
companies is defined, differs across cultures (Singh, 2005). Asano-Tamanoi (1988) 
compares the different perceptions of contract farming by closely examining the 
relationships between various actors related to contract farming in Japan and Spain.  
The benefits of contract farming to the farming community at large also depend on 
government policies for agricultural development (Singh 2005). Therefore, some studies 
emphasize the important role of the state in encouraging or discouraging the 
agribusiness firms and in protecting the producers in contract situations (Christensen, 
1992; Grosh, 1994; Benziger, 1996). 
 A case study by Asano-Tamanoi (1988) in Mino in Japan, found that a long-term 
isolated peasant-merchant relationship did not emerge.  Several factors prevented the 
parties from directly contracting. “First, peasants tried to organize themselves into 
groups in buying or selling certain products vis-à-vis specific merchants; and second, 
the government, in order to increase the direct control of the agricultural sector, tried to 
block the penetration and spread of the power of private merchants in the local villages. 
The merging of these two forces from "below" and "above," then, resulted in the 
establishment of an agricultural cooperative in 1900, which could partially succeed in 
supplanting merchant capital on the local scene” (Asano-Tamari 1988). Government 
policy in Japan in the 1980’s was organized in such a way that farmers and firms could 
contract through intermediary organizations, such as cooperatives, but not directly. This 
policy aimed also to protect individual farmers since firms would have more say and 
bargaining power in negotiations for contracts. By creating a cooperative to serve as an 
intermediary or negotiator, voices of farmers could be heard as a collective force.  
 Minot (1986) found that farmers generally benefit from contract farming because it 
provides them with inputs on credit, technical assistance, and often a guaranteed price, 
allowing them to produce a higher-value commodity than would otherwise be possible. 
At the same time, contract farming should not be considered a broad-based strategy for 
rural development because it is only cost-effective when large-scale buyers, such as 
processors or exporters, need to introduce a new crop, to obtain special product 
characteristics, to stagger the harvest over the year, or to control some aspect of the 
production methods.  Contract farming is typically used to organize production of 
perishable, high-value commodities for a quality-sensitive market.  However, cases in 
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which buyers or farmers violate the terms of the contract are common and a good 
number of contract farming schemes fail for one reason or another (Minot, 1986).  
 Contract farming is often seen as a way to reduce costs of cultivation by firms and by 
farmers. This is because it can provide access to better inputs and more efficient 
production methods for farmers as Minot (1986) has also discussed. The increasing cost 
of cultivation was the reason for the emergence of contract farming in Japan and Spain 
in the 1950s (Asano-Tamanoi, 1988) and in the Indian Punjab in the early 1990s (Singh, 
2000). Other studies provide a more skeptical view of the benefits of contract farming.  
Little and Watts (1994) compiled a set of seven case studies of contract farming in 
sub-Saharan Africa. The case studies focused on the historical and political context of 
contract farming, conflicts between farmers and the contracting firms, the imbalance of 
power between the two parties, intra-household tensions over the division of labor and 
the allocation of new revenues, and the increasing rural inequality as contract farmers 
grow wealthy enough to hire farm laborers.   
Little (1994: 221) reviewed some case studies and concluded that, “incomes from 
contract farming increased for a moderate (30-40%) to a high (50-60%) proportion of 
participants.” However, this income was not enough to live on and farmers had to rely 
on other farm and non-farm income. In addition, he surmised that contract farming often 
exacerbates income inequality by favoring middle- to large-scale growers. In several 
cases, households lost land that was appropriated for government-run contract farming 
schemes.   
In a review of the experience of contract farming in Africa in the early 1990s, Porter 
and Phillips-Howard (1997) concluded that farmers were generally better off as a result 
of their participation in contract farming, in spite of a number of social problems that 
arose in the communities. Similarly, Singh (2002) identified a series of problems 
associated with contract vegetable production in the Punjab state in India. Singh 
concluded that the contract farming done by multi-national corporations is with 
relatively larger farmers and its arrangement is biased against the contract farmers. The 
issues identified are imbalanced power between farmers and companies, violation of the 
terms of the agreements, social differentiation, and lack of environmental sustainability.  
Nonetheless, his surveys revealed that most farmers saw incomes rise and were satisfied 
with the contract arrangement.    
 Singh (2005) also reviewed cases where many of the studies found contracts 
inequitable, short-term, and ambiguous. However, he concluded that, “it is not the 
contract per se which is harmful but how it is practiced in a given context”. His review 
introduced the situations where contract farming brought benefits. For example, apart 
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from providing farmers more reliable incomes, contract farming generated employment 
especially for women, provided new farming skills, and did away with the patron–client 
relationship between large and small producers (Singh 2005, Glover and Kusterer 1990, 
Fulton and Clark 1996). However, “the contracts were biased and enforced strictly, 
firms provided poor extension service, over-priced their services, passed on the risk to 
the producers, offered low prices of produce, favored larger farmers, delayed payments, 
did not provide compensation for natural calamity loss, and did not explain the pricing 
method (Singh 2005)” (Glover and Kusterer 1990; Grosh 1994; Singh 2002). The firms 
tend to move on to new growers and lands after exhausting the natural potential of the 
local resources, particularly land and water, or when productivity declines due to some 
other reason (Torres 1997). Other cases of contract farming faced many problems like 
undue quality declines on produce by firms, delayed deliveries at the factory, delayed 
payments, low prices, and pest attacks on the crops (Rangi and Sidhu, 2000; Singh, 
2002; Dileep et. al., 2002; and Satish, 2003).  
 
2.1 Key Factors for Success 
Major conditions and key factors for successful contract farming interlocking 
agribusiness firms and small producers include,  
1. Increased competition for procurement instead of monopsony;  
2. Guaranteed market for farmer produce and effective repayment mechanism; 
3. Market information for farmers to effectively bargain with companies; 
4. Large volumes of transactions through groups of farmers for lowering 
transaction costs;  
5. Co-operation among genuine agribusiness firms in the area; and  
6. No alternative source of raw material for firms (Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002). 
 
Further, for success of company-farmer partnership schemes, it is important that the 
company is able to successfully market its products so that farmers do not suffer from 
lack of markets (Baumann, 2000; Haque, 2000). Building the relationships of trust with 
farmers through company reputation rather than marketing gimmicks is crucial. This 
requires mutual respect, fair and transparent negotiation processes, realistic assessment 
of benefits, long term commitments, equitable sharing of risk, and sound business plans 
(Mayers and Vermeulen, 2002). Marketing extension is also required in terms of better 
product planning at the farmer level, provision of market information, securing and 
accessing markets for farmers, provision of alternative markets, and market orientation 
regarding improved marketing practices at the farmer level (Patnaik, 2003). However, 
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guaranteed market pricing mechanisms may not work for all cases since comparisons 
must be made with other famers’ options and depending on farmers’ incentives.   
 
2.2 Participation in Contact Farming  
A number of studies have examined the proportion of contract farmers that are 
smallholders, as an indicator of the pro-poor impact of contracting. Guo et al (2005) 
used data from farm-level surveys in China covering several products to estimate the 
likelihood of participating in a contract farming scheme as a function of household 
characteristics, crop mix, and farm size. The results indicated that small farmers are less 
likely to participate in contract farming than larger farmers.   
 Similarly, Runsten and Key (1996) looked at contract farming by the tomato 
processing industry in Mexico. Multi-national agro-processors from the United States 
first contracted with large growers, but then also involved the small growers. Part of the 
reason was that as a lucrative market for fresh tomatoes developed, firms found it 
increasingly difficult to enforce contracts they had with larger growers.    
 A few studies give examples of buyers shifting from small to large-scale farmers or the 
reverse. One example cited in World Bank (2006), was an exporter in Thailand that 
started producing its own horticultural products on company land and later shifted to 
smallholder contract production. Minot and Ngigi (2004) described the evolution of 
several contract farming schemes in Kenya, including one (Del Monte pineapple) that 
gave up on contract production and others that have shifted from large to small-scale 
production. In Senegal, green bean exporters switched from small-scale contract 
production to large-scale production (Maertens, 2006). These findings confirm that the 
comparative advantage of smallholders is not a static concept, but can change as farmers 
and buyers experiment and learn from their experience. It also implies that public policy 
may be able to play a role in supporting the participation of small farmers in these 
supply chains (Miyata and Minot, 2007). 
 
3. Evidence of Contact Farming on Farm Income 
 
Other studies provide more direct evidence in the form of income or gross margin 
comparisons. For example, Birthal et al (2005) compared the gross margins of poultry, 
dairy, and vegetable contract farmers with independent farmers producing the same 
commodities. The gross margins for contract dairy farmers were almost double that of 
independent dairy farmers, largely because contract growers had lower production and 
marketing costs. The gross margin for contract vegetable growers was 79% greater than 
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that of independent vegetable growers’ income, and for poultry, the gross margin of 
contract farmers was 13% higher. Although they do not use regression analysis to 
control for other factors, they show that contract farmers had higher gross margins for 
small-, medium-, and large-scale farmers. A logit analysis of participation in the contract 
farming schemes indicates that farm size and education are not significant predictors, 
implying that small farmers are not excluded from contracting.     
 A few studies of contract farming take into account that contract farmers are generally 
not a random sample of the population; they may differ from the population in ways that 
also affect income. For example, if farmers that sign up for contract schemes are more 
hard-working or more skilled than others, the difference in income between contract 
farmers and other farmers will reflect both the effect of contracting and the effect of 
those characteristics. This bias can be corrected using a Heckman selection regression 
model or an instrumental variables model.  
 Warning and Key (2002) study contract farming in peanuts in Senegal. NOVASEN, a 
private company, contracted 32,000 growers and produced approximately 40,000 tons 
of peanuts annually. The authors estimated gross profits using a two-step Heckman 
procedure to control for selection bias. They found that the increase in gross agricultural 
revenues associated with contracting was statistically significant and large, equal to 
about 55% of the average revenue of non-contract farmers. Various measures of assets 
were not significant predictors of participation in the contract farming scheme, 
suggesting that contractors were typical rural households.   
 Another study, carried out in Indonesia by Simmons et al (2005), examined contract 
growers of poultry, seed maize, and seed rice. They also used a Heckman model to 
control for selection bias. The poultry contracts and seed maize contracts resulted in 
improved returns to capital, while no significant impact was found in the case of seed 
rice. Contract seed growers were more likely to be large farmers, compared to 
independent growers, but contract poultry production tended to be smaller than 
independent poultry growers. They concluded that the contracts increase income and 
welfare, reducing absolute poverty.   
 Ramaswami et al (2006) re-analyzed the poultry survey data from the above-cited 
study by Birthal et al (2005), except that they used an instrumental variable regression 
analysis to control for selection bias. They found that average gross margins were 
similar between contract growers and others, but the regression analysis indicated 
significant gains from contracting. The explanation is that contract growers are less 
experienced and have less access to credit than other growers. Thus, they gain more 
from the management assistance and the credit provided by the firm than would more 
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capable farmers who already have access to credit. The incomes of contract farmers are 
significantly higher than they would have been without the contract, but only slightly 
higher than the incomes of the more-skilled independent growers. In addition, the 
authors also showed that the variability of gross margins across production cycles was 
much lower for contract growers than for independent growers, revealing another 
benefit of contracting.   
  Miyata and Minot (2007) studied the participation of contract farming in green onions 
and apples in Shandong province in China. They used logit, OLS, and treatment effect 
regression models to compare the results. A treatment effect regression model is used to 
control for selection bias. Using survey data collected from 162 apple and green onion 
farmers and from four contracting firms, they showed that contract farmers do not have 
larger farms nor are they more educated than independent growers. They used a 
Heckman selection model to control for possible selection bias and found that contract 
farmers’ income was significantly higher than independent farmers, after controlling for 
household size and composition, farm size, farm assets, and other characteristics. 
Similar to the study by Ramaswami et al (2006), the incomes of contract farmers seem 
to be significantly higher than they would have been without the contract after 
controlling for possible selection biases in the regression analysis.  
 Miyata and Minot (2007) also examined the contractual arrangements between the 
contract farmers and the contracting firms. They found that all firms have multiple 
production sources of firm-own farms, contract farmers, and from spot markets. The 
proportion of production coming from contract farmers varied widely across firms 
depending on whether each firm has their own farm. They also found that some firms 
took two steps in selecting the contract farmers. For example, an apple firm would first 
choose the city or town and its vicinity within a certain distance from their firm that is 
well known for high quality soil, which grows higher quality apples. They would then 
contact the potential villages that the firm is interested in contracting with. The firm 
would choose the villages where village heads or leaders are cooperative and interested, 
as well as where location and soil quality met the firm’s standard. Within each village, 
the village head or an equivalent leader would take the responsibility of distributing all 
seed and fertilizers and also collecting the harvest. As a result, the location of contract 
farmers naturally is close to village head’s farmland. This way, the village head can 
monitor the contracting farms and is also able to distribute the inputs easily to all the 
contract farmers. Through this field observation, the distance to the village head’s 
farmland was identified as a potential instrument to control for selection bias. The 
treatment effect regression results show the significant role distance to the village head’s 
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farmland plays.  
  Apart from the above-mentioned works, there are also various empirical studies of 
contracting by livestock farmers, which is the focus of this research. Many of the hog 
and broiler industry cases argue that risk reduction is a major incentive for contracting 
(Johnson and Foster, 1994; Knoeber and Thurman, 1995; Martin, 1997; Parcel and 
Langemeir, 1997). Among such studies, Key (2005) estimated the non-pecuniary net 
benefits of farming independently compared to farming under a production contract, 
paying particular attention to the importance of risk reduction in the decision to contract 
or remain independent in the U.S. hog industry. The benefits to growers from 
contracting, such as risk reduction, may be overestimated if the non-pecuniary benefits 
enjoyed by independent producers are not accounted for. An example of a 
non-pecuniary benefit could include the right to make management decisions and own 
the commodity produced. Various economists have measured the value that workers 
place on attributes of their jobs. An agricultural study by Gillespie and Eidman (1998) 
surveyed 20 hog farmers to elicit utility functions and preferences for various contract 
structures and then used this information to estimate an autonomy premium. 
  Key (2005) developed a new method that used information on actual returns to 
contract and independent feeder-to-finish hog production. “First, information from a 
national survey of 477 feeder-to-finish hog producers and 10 years of monthly price 
data are used to estimate the mean and coefficient of variation of net returns from 
independent hog production. Second, a treatment effects model is applied to the same 
national survey to estimate how much of the difference in per unit income between 
contract and independent operations can be attributed to contracting. For a given level 
of risk aversion, the estimated variation in contract and noncontract income is used to 
compute the risk premium—the amount a representative grower would pay for the 
risk-reducing benefits of a contract. Finally, the autonomy premium—the non-pecuniary 
net benefits from independent production—is estimated as the sum of the expected 
difference in contract and noncontract income and the risk premium” (Key, 2005: 118). 
Results showed that growers have strongly prefer autonomy, with moderately 
risk-averse growers being willing to pay more for the attributes of independent 
production than they would for the risk-reducing benefits of a contract. 
 
3.1 Conditions for successful Contract farming 
Coordination, Motivation, and Transaction Costs are three pillars of a contract 
arrangement. Therefore, it is important to consider contract design as a multi-criterion 
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decision problem (Singh, 2005). Singh (2005) summarized the basic rules for contract 
design:   
1. Coordinating to minimize production costs which means using price signals or 
instructions or both;  
2. Balancing decentralization and centralization in farm decisions which impact 
problems like moral hazard and hold-up;  
3. Minimizing or sharing risk and uncertainty;  
4. Reducing the costs of pre- and post-contractual opportunism (adverse selection 
and moral hazard) by various mechanisms for allocating contracts and 
monitoring. Moral hazard costs could be reduced through having one party bear 
part of the cost, social pressures, incentive structures, or group 
contracts/incentives. Adverse selection could be mitigated by rationing, or 
offering a contract suited only for some ‘good’ farmers; having a ‘menu of 
contracts’ for screening farmers so that they reveal their true type by choosing 
certain contracts; having group contracts; and creating individual risk 
rating/information collection processes before contract is signed; 
5. Encouraging group or co-operative action among producers to lower costs and 
ensure better compliance;  
6. Motivating long term contracts to reduce hold-up problems;  
7. Balancing pros and cons of the renegotiation of contracts over time;  
8. Reducing direct costs of contracting; and  
9. Using transparent contracts (Bogetoft and Olesen, 2002). 
 
Contract arrangements that have failed previously have missed at least one of these 
rules. Though these rules are useful as a checklist for keeping the contract relationship 
balanced between firms and farmers, realizing every item in a timely manner is not an 
easy task.  
Under a condition of surplus labor in agriculture, the firm’s opportunity cost related 
to breaking contract conditions is small. This implies that for most developing 
economies, enforcement of contracts becomes a more critical issue in implementing 
contract farming than in the developed economies where labor in agriculture or farmers 
are scarce. From this perspective, contract farming is most effective after an agricultural 
labor surplus has disappeared.  
 
 12
4. Evidence of Hog industry in Jilin and Henan province, China 
 
This section summarizes some of the preliminary findings from the firm survey, 
focusing on the questions related to procurement sources of hogs, whether hog firms 
contract with farmers directly, and their experience in contract farming (as other 
sections have discussed findings on pricing behavior by firms and other topics in detail). 
 
4.1 Characteristics of Surveyed Hog Firms  
The summary of basic characteristics of the surveyed hog firms is shown in Table 4-1. 
These firms in Jilin province are relatively new and are of smaller scale compared to 
those in Henan province. The average firm inception year in Henan is 1992, ranging 
from 1954 to 2007, while average starting year in Jilin is 2000, ranging from 1985 to 
2008. The oldest firm in Henan is 30 years older than that in Jilin. Some firms in Henan 
might have started on a small scale, but have developed and expanded their business 
over the years. This may be partly the reason why the firms in Henan are larger than 
those in Jilin. For example, the average firm assets in 2007 in Jilin province were RMB 
3,310 (US$ 479.71), while in Henan they averaged RMB 7,259 (US$ 1052.0). Total 
average sales in 2007 in Jilin province were RMB 2,649, compared to RMB 28,321 in 
Henan province.  
 Firms in Henan province were also shown to handle more than three times of volume 
of pork in average compared to Jilin. By looking at the sales share, we found a general 
tendency in Henan province that sales earmarked for export, supermarkets, branded 
name outlets, and wholesalers were higher. These customers tend to require higher 
quality produce while the share of wet market sales, where quality requirements are the 
lowest, was higher in Jilin province.   
 
Table 4-1 Basic Characteristics of Firms in Jilin and Henan 
                                                        
1 Exchange rate at the time of survey in June, 2008. USD1=approximately 6.9RMB Yuan (June 2008 
average) (Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF, http://www.imfstatistics.org/imf/)  
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Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Firm start year 2000.7 5 1992.4 16 1996.5 13
Asset in 2007 (RMB Yuan) 3310 12383 7259 42328 5304 31299
Profit in 2007 (RMB Yuan) 48 328 1247 8928 650 6346
Sale in 2007 (RMB Yuan) 2649 11412 28321 214265 15608 152628
Total Sales 2007 (RMB Yuan) 2536 10381 9804 36026 6223 26858
Raising hogs share (%) 1.4 8.7 0.8 6.2 1.1 7.5
Volume of Pork (tons) 2301 8292 7023 23605 4638 17736
Sales share (%)
Export sale (%) 0.02 0.20 0.04 0.39 0.03 0.31
Supermarket sale (%) 3.97 11.50 6.21 16.33 5.10 14.16
Restaurant sale (%) 2.15 10.20 1.84 6.76 1.99 8.62
Brand outlet sale (%) 3.53 14.39 4.46 15.22 4.00 14.79
Wholesaler sale (%) 21.92 29.35 41.12 42.97 31.57 37.98
Wetmarket sale (%) 68.00 36.39 48.38 44.57 58.09 41.80
Observations 
Jilin Henan All 
103 105 208
(Source) CAAS-IDE Jilin Henan Hog Industry Survey 
(Note) Date not quoted is in 2008. 
 
Table 4-2 shows the procurement sources of hogs in Jilin and in Henan. The major 
source in Jilin is through a middleman, averaging 70%, and independent farmers, 
averaging 15%. In Henan, average procurement sources ranged from middleman at 42% 
to a firm’s own farm at 13%. The wide variety of procurement sources in Henan-based 
firms’ portfolios may reflect the long years of experience to reduce risk. Firms would 
prefer to have backup and diversified sources for obtaining hogs so that even if one 
source fails to provide enough hogs, or could not provide the agreed upon volume, firms 
can continue to operate. Also, as the local market developed, firms in Henan province 
pursued ways to secure stable and high quality sources of hogs. As a result, firms 
diversified their procurement sources, learning from previous endeavors.  
 
Table 4-2 Procurement Sources of Hogs (%) 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Firm's own farm 1.03 4.47 2.71 12.88 1.87 9.65
Contract 3.43 15.49 9.71 22.84 6.57 19.72
Firm's procurement team 3.48 16.26 27.25 37.17 15.36 31.00
Middleman 70.29 41.24 48.58 42.03 59.43 42.94
Independent farmers   ?? 15.22 33.11 11.36 26.78 13.30 30.11
Other? 6.56 23.73 0.43 2.19 3.51 17.13
Jilin Henan All 
 
(Source) CAAS-IDE Jilin Henan Hog Industry Survey 
(Note) 204 observations (valid answers) 
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4.2 Relationships with Contract Farmers 
Out of 208 firms, 36 firms had some type of contractual arrangements with farmers, 
including informal, or oral, contracts. Table 4-3 shows the forms of contracts carried out 
by the surveyed firms. Nearly half of the contracts were signed directly by farmers and 
about one-third were informal oral contracts. Four firms had contracts signed by 
cooperative farmers and three firms had contracts where farmers signed but negotiation 
took place through cooperatives. The surveyed firms had mostly direct contracts, either 
in a written or oral format, rather than via cooperatives.  
 
Table 4-3 Type of contract with farmers 
Farmer signed the contract (no coop involved) 18 46.2%
Oral contract 13 33.3%
Cooperative Farmers signed the contract 4 10.3%
Farmer signed, but negotiation via cooperatives 3 7.7%
Other 1 2.6%
39 100.0%  
(Source) CAAS-IDE Jilin Henan Hog Industry Survey 
(Note: multiple answers) 
 
Out of 41 responses from those firms who had contractual arrangements with farmers, 
more than 60% of firms employ market prices rather than guaranteed, pre-fixed pricing 
(Table 4-4). This may be due to the fact that pork prices have been fluctuating relatively 
highly and firms prefer to reflect the market price since the price of meat has been 
following an upward trend in conjuncture with oil, feed, transportation and other input 
costs.  
 
Table 4-4 Price agreement with farmers 
Market price at the procurement timing 15 36.6%
Fixed price upon signing the contract 13 31.7%
Market price plus premium 10 24.4%
Guaranteed price 1 2.4%
Other 2 4.9%
Total 41 100%  
(Source) CAAS-IDE Jilin Henan Hog Industry Survey 
(Note: multiple answers. Contracted firms are 36.) 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this chapter we have found that there are many pros and cons embedded in contract 
farming experiences. Early studies discussed the imbalanced power and historical and 
political context in contract farming between farmers and firms, finding various 
problems that made the sustainability of contract arrangements difficult. Some studies 
provided evidence that contract farming actually benefits small farmers through 
enabling them to participate in modern market chains. Farmers benefit by receiving 
inputs on credit, technical assistance, and often a guaranteed price, allowing them to 
produce a higher-value commodity than would otherwise be possible. Several studies 
also provided evidence of contract farming benefiting farmers’ income by using a 
Heckman model or a treatment effect model to control for possible biases.  
? However, cases in which buyers or farmers violate the terms of the contract are 
common and a good number of contract farming schemes fail for one reason or another. 
By examining empirical studies, we were able to list in this chapter the key factors and 
conditions for success. Although the application of these conditions has yet to be seen in 
empirical studies, these conditions should be reviewed and revised carefully depending 
on each commodity, industry, and market situation.  
? The preliminary results from the hog industry firm survey in the Jilin and Henan 
provinces showed that contract farming is more prevalent in regions where the hog 
industry has a long history of experiences and is larger in scale. As we saw in other 
studies, firms in the Chinese hog industry also try to secure procurement sources in 
order to reduce risk by diversifying their sources and obtaining hogs not only from the 
firms’ own farms, but also by organizing a special firm procurement team and 
contracting with middleman, independent farmers, and others.  
? The contract type and price arrangement information obtained through the survey 
were also summarized in this chapter. Types included written and oral contracts and also 
some involvement of cooperatives acting between firms and farmers in either signing 
the contract or in negotiating the terms. Further analysis using the firm survey data is 
the next task to further understand and detail how and why these differences in contract 
types arise.  
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